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OFFICIOUSNESSt
EDWARD
PART II.

W. HOPE*

TYPICAL OCCASIONS WHERE "OFFICIOUSNESS"
QUESTION

COMES IN

There are a number of ways in which A by rendering unrequested
service may intervene in B's affairs, thus making the propriety of his
intervention the point at issue in a suit to obtain remuneration from
B. It is proposed in the second part of this article to arrange and
discuss these different occasions of A's interposition, beginning with
those in which his officiousness is most often and successfully offered
as a defense. We will therefore consider the cases in the following
order: (I) where A pays B's money debt to C; (II) where A performs
B's contract with C; (III) where A saves B's property; (IV) where A
saves B's life, health, or limb; (V) where A's service in any of the
above instances is supported by public interest; (VI) where A's
service in the named situations is justified by the principle of selfprotection or self-interest.
In connection with the first two occasions of intervention especially, the part that equity plays through its doctrine of subrogation
must be studied.
I. A pays B's money debt to C: We are to consider this as done
under the following limitations: (a) A means to benefit B. (b) A
means that B shall repay him. (c) There is no actual prior request
for the service, or actual subsequent ratification of it by B. (d)
A pays the debt voluntarily, and not by (i) mere unconscious inadvertence, or (2) mistake of fact, thinking it to be his own debt, or
(3)mistake of law, thinking he is legally liable to pay it, or (4)constraint of legal obligation (surety, guarantor, and the like), or (5)
necessity of self-protection through B's default, or (6) the invitation
of public interest.
These conditions strip away all possibility of contract or agency
between A and B as to the payment, all innocent error and justifying
constraint on A's part, and nothing is left but the voluntary payment of the debt with the intention of benefiting B.1 Naturally, A is
tThis is the second and final installment of the article, the first having appeared

in

(1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25.
*Professor of Law, University of South Dakota.

'We are not as yet considering A's possible rights against B through equitable
subrogation, but only his rights in quasi contract. Numerous expressions in the
cases and in the works of writers seem to indicate that he would have no rights in

either tribunal. The voice of the law usually is that one man cannot pay another's
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a volunteer here, but on principles already discussed that should not
2
be fatal, unless he is an officious volunteer.
How can A expect to benefit B by paying his debt when A from
the first intends to make B pay him instead of paying C? Is it not
merely substituting one creditor for another? That is true, but
there might be benefit to B even in that case. A might be a more
lenient creditor, and intend to be such. If A's motive is beneficent,
he may not be officious in a legal sense, but in any event he must show
actual benefit to B, or he cannot recover*even though he was not
officious. 3 However, there is another way for benefit to arise, and
debt without his request and thereby substitute himself as his creditor, while
equity, it is said, declines to assist a volunteer. LEAxE, CONTRACTS (7th ed. 1921)
45: "A voluntary payment of the debt of another, without request, and under
no'legal liability or compulsion, gives no claim for the money paid against the
person whose debt is discharged." But immediately after this, the author says
that, if A pays an insurance premium for B, he may recover if he has an "interest
to do so", though there was no duty, contract, or request. See infra p. 239 for
a discussion of the kind of interest which this may be.
2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (I5th ed. 1892) § 114: "Where no express order or
request has been given, it will ordinarily be sufficient for the plaintiff to show
that he has paid money for the defendant for a reasdnable cause, and not officiously." KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893) 388:
"No one officiously paying the debt of another can maintain an action either at
law or in equity to recover from the debtor the money so paid. To hold otherwise would be to hold that a person has a right to thrust himself officiously upon
another as his creditor. If, however, the payment made, though made without
request, is not regarded in law as having been officiously made, the party so
paying is entitled to be reimbursed by the debtor.. ." These two passages
are quoted with approval by the court in Irvine v. Angus, 93 Fed. 629, 633
(C. C. A. 9th, 1889). The two writers cited have been discussing the case of an
officious volunteer. The court prefers to call such person a "mere volunteer",
but all three are talking about officiousness. Interpreting the above passages, the
court says: "A mere volunteer is not entitled to be repaid money which he has
expended for the benefit of another. Who is a 'volunteer', within the meaning of
this rule? A volunteer is one who has paid the debts of another without request,
when he was not legally or morally [italics mine] bound to do so, and when he had
no interest to protect in making such payment..." It follows that a volunteer,
if acting under a moral urge, is not officious and is entitled to repayment if he
has conferred a benefit, thougl! he was not obliged to confer it by law or the
necessity of self-protection. This puts a different face upon the matter and does
not at all agree with Leake's statement, supra note I. See also Bates v. Townley,
154 Eng. Repr. 444 (1848); Sleigh v. Sleigh, 5 Ex. 514 (185o); CLARK, CONTRACTS
(3d ed. 1914) 627.

3In Butler v. Rice, [1910] 2 Ch. 277, the point is stressed that, where A (by
mistake) pays B's debt, and this does not increase B's burden, but is merely
making him pay A instead of C, B should not object to this, as A is not seeking
to create a new charge in his own favor. A was allowed recovery, though B did
not request or know of A's payment. Note that no benefit to B is required, but
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that is where by paying the debt A saves B's property. This kind
of a case logically comes within the third way or occasion for intervention before mentioned, since it would not seem that the mere
means or manner in which property is saved is important, whether it
4
be by payment of a debt or by the expenditure of labor.
Given the fact that there is a real benefit to B in any case where A
pays his debt, there might seem to be little reason for employing
a stricter rule against A in these cases than where the benefit is to
B's life, health, or property. And yet such reading of the cases
as time has permitted shows a clear tendency, approaching a settled
habit, to deny recovery to A when he has paid B's debt under the
limitations set by the first paragraph of this section. With hardly
a break the decisions require that B shall have requested the payment, or shall have subsequently ratified it, or consented to it by
promising repayment, or have relied on it in some way, or that A
should have been obligated or constrained to pay. In other words,
contract law or self-protective principles govern almost without
exception. 5
Wherever either of these two principles can work, A is allowed to
prevail. A late case worthy of note is Morin v. Bond, where A and
B, each owning one-half of a tobacco crop, sold it to C as being
sound in quality, C paying to each one-half of the purchase price.
only that his burden shall not be increased. See a note in (1910)24 HARv. L. ,Ev.
161. This is a proper case for equity, and the result seems to be good; but in
quasi contract, a benefit rendered B is necessary for A's success. It should be
noted that the mere absence of harm to B does not at all meet the classic objection to one's substituting himself as creditor of another.
4
Such debt-paying and property-saving cases will be considered, therefore,
with property-saving cases, infra p. 227.
5
McGlew v. McDade, 146 Calif. 553, 80 Pac. 695 (igo5); Durant v. Rogers, 71
Ill. 121 (1873); Shirts v. Irons, 28 Ind. 459 (1867); Benson v. Thompson, 27 Me.
471 (1847); Inhabitants of So. Scituate v. Inhabitants of Hanover, 9 Gray 426
(Mass. 1857) (facts not clear as to why A paid debt here); Helm v. Smith-Fee Co.,
76 Minn. 328, 79 N. W. 313 (1899); Beach v. Vandenburgh, io Johns. 361 (N. Y.
1813); Matter of Rider, 68 Misc. 270, 124 N. Y. Supp. iooi (Surr. Ct. I9io)
(questionable decision, as children had an interest). It is to be observed, however, that many of the cases where A is defeated on the basis of the usual rule
that one cannot make himself another's creditor without his request could have
been decided on other principles involved in their facts: Kenan v. Holloway, i6
Ala. 53 (1849) (no benefit to B); Edwards v. Hardwood Mfg. Co., 59 Minn. 178,
6o N. W. 1097 (1894) (same); Albany v. McNamara, 117 N. Y. 168,21 N. E. 931
(1889) (intended gift); in re Babcock, 169 N. Y. Supp. 8oo (Surr. Ct. 1917)
(same); Evarts v. Adams, 12 Johns. 352 (N. Y. i815) (A's loan in violation of
statute); Nat. Bk. of Ballston Spa v. Board of Supervisors, io6 N. Y. 488, 13
N. E. 439 (1887) (same-see KEENER, op. cit. supranote 2, at 347).
6a96 Conn. 642, 115 Atl. 218 (1921).
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It turned out to be in part unsound, and on C's demand A paid
back a part of the price covering what both he and B were liable for.
This was without B's express request. In the lower court it was
held that A was a mere volunteer in paying for B's half, and recovery
was denied. The upper court reversed this on the ground that the
facts warranted the jury in finding that B had given A authority
to control the entire sale and its terms, such not being complete
until C was reimbursed. A, therefore, acted throughout within
his authority. The court declines to say what, if this were not so,
A's rights would be on the theory of equitable subrogation. It adds
with significance,5b "One thing is to be remembered in such situations. The law is solicitous to prevent one man enriching himself
at the cost of another who has in good faith paid that other's obligation." As it is very often difficult or impossible to distinguish
certainly between a tacit (real) request and an implied (unreal)
one, that is, between a contract and a quasi contract, 6 courts desirous
of doing full justice and yet hesitant about raising the law's implied
promise can often find, as was the case here, a tacit request. It is
at least a good result.
The question we are considering sometimes arises in the case
of connecting carriers. In Wabash R. R. v. Pearce,"a it was held that
an initial carrier may pay the legal duties on imported goods demanded by the United States at the port of entry, in order to secure
possession of the goods so as to start their transportation inland;
and that upon so paying it will be subrogated to the lien which the
United States had upon the goods. Also, that the ultimate carrier
who has advanced the legal charges to the preceding carrier "is not a
mere volunteer" and may recover such charges from the owner and
hold the goods under its lien until payment is made.
It would be possible, it seems, to find a real request from owner to
carrier to pay the necessary and customary charges where the owner
himself has ordered goods sent to him. No officiousness could enter
here. But suppose goods are sent to B by mistake or on a chance,
he not having ordered them, and that the proper charges are in good
faith paid by A (initial or ultimate carrier). If B rejects the goods, A
cannot recover, but this is not because of A's officiousness, but
because of no benefit accruing to B. No doubt A could recover from
the sender, he being in no position to charge A with officiousness.
5b-bid. at 644, 115 Ati. at 219.

6Ex parte Bishop. In re Fox, Walker & Co., 15 Ch. D. 400 (I880); Lewisohn,
Contract Distinguishedfrom Quasi Contract (1913) a CALIF. L. REv. 71; Costigan,
Constructive Contracts (1907) 19 GREEN BAG 512.
6a192 U. S. 179, 24

Sup.

Ct.

231

(1904).
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In American Ry. Express Co. v. Heilbrunn,6b the plaintiff carrier,
after delivery of the goods from Canada to defendant in New York,
paid the duty thereon upon demand of the United States. Defendant had accepted the goods before this payment was made, his
being the legal obligation to pay the duty assessed. It was held that
plaintiff was "a mere volunteer", as it was under no legal obligation
to pay. Recovery was denied. By dictum, the court added that,
if the plaintiff while still in possession of the goods had paid the
duty, or promised to pay it to prevent the goods from being stopped,
it might have collected from the defendant the amount paid.
In this case it could be supposed that the tacit request of the owner
that the carrier pay the duties ended upon delivery, B assuming
the duty of paying from that time. B owed a debt to the United
States (C), and C not only accepted payment from A, but demanded
it. It seems that justice would require A's subrogation to C's rights.
A can hardly be thought officious f it paid under a sense of duty,
or thought that the United States had the power of exacting payment.
As to the dictum that A's possession would have made a difference,
it is believed that on principle this is not important,7 except as B's
tacit request may be thought to continue during such possession.8
The writer must admit that to the present he has found no instance
where, subject to the strict limitations outlined above, A has been
allowed to recover for paying B's money debt to C.9 There seems to
be no reason why recovery should not be allowed here in a proper
case.' 0 The fact seems to be that the "contract complex" which
6b1 2 0 Misc. 501, 198 N. Y. Supp. 8oi (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, i8o N. Y. 560, 73
N. E. 1125 (1905).

7WOODwARD, THE LAW OF QuAsI CONTRACTS (1g3) § 207.
"That B does make a tacit request of the carrier to pay the duties in such cases
the following seems to indicate: "A connecting carrier is under no obligation
to make advancement for charges paid by a preceding carrier or to give credit
therefor, even though it is customary so to do... [N]evertheless a connecting
carrier may advance the charges of the preceding carrier, including charges
which the preceding carrier may have already advanced in the same way, and
demand the full amount of its own charges and the advancements at the end
of the transportation... This, it is said, is a right long sanctioned by law and
custom, and is founded on public convenience and common sense" IO C. J. 444.
It will have been noticed that contract, subrogation, and the item of selfinterest enter into these carrier cases, and for this reason they do not wholly
belong here. So many and mixed are the factors of decision, however, that it is
well-nigh impossible to make a clear-cut, logical arrangement.
OBut see Ott v. Chapline, 3 Harr. & McH. (Md. 1793), cited in a note in (i9o9)
58 U. OF PA. L. REv. 328; Friedlanderv. Lehman, zoi N.Y. Supp. 252 (Sup. Ct.
z9o6) (the test is made "reasonable occasion" for A's action).
10KEENER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 325, says: "In point of principle it is submitted that it is impossible to distinguish between the receipt of money or other
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shapes the attitude of the courts elsewhere is found in concentrated
form in the debt cases, as it is also where A performs B's contract.
This is no more than should have been expected from the nature
of the relation interfered with. In equity the story is somewhat
different, as will be seen presently.
I. A. Subrogation in equity, where A pays B's money debt to C:
Where A, having paid B's money debt to C, sues B at law in indebitatus assumpsit for money paid to B's use, there must have been,
as we have seen," some benefit therefrom to B, in order that A may
merit recovery in quasi contract, and this entirely irrespective of any
lack of officiousness on A's part. If, however, A should proceed in
equity, the rather surprising fact becomes apparent that benefit to B
is of no importance in determining A's rights against B, but that A's
In subrogation
rights are worked out through C, the creditor.
(A), beneactor
cases there are always three persons to consider:
method of
of
equity's
peculiarity
The
(C).
ficiary (B), and creditor
of the
character
triangular
this
disposing of such cases arises from
but
determined,
to
be
are
which
B's
rights
not
only
problem. It is
assignment.
through
realize
or
may
has
also those of C, which he
The almost sacred idea of privity of contract, and the consequent
resistance to all alienation of choses in action at the common law, is
elementary learning, but highly pertinent to recall at this point.
The common law view gave way before the necessities of modem
business: "Under our modem law, business necessity has largely
done away with the idea of the sacredness and inviolability of the
personal relationship of the parties to choses in action... It never
has been considered that the personality of the creditor mattered
to the debtor once the obligation was created; it could matter only
in the formation of the contract." 12 C may transfer to A, though A is
B's worst enemy, and this is no injury to B. The law considers that
as long as C has legal title (as he does in transfers of negotiable instruments, for example) it is a greater hardship on C not to let him
transfer this to A (though B's enemy) than it is to B to have a new
creditor thrust upon him. The same is true of simple contract debts
(only here the assignee does not get legal title); but B cannot object
to C's transfer to A, nor is B's consent necessary. What difference
property by the defendant and the receipt of services." In the Roman law, the
negotiorum gestor could as freely pay a debt of his principal as perform any other
kind of service.
"Supra p. 206.
1Costigan, The Doctrine of Boston Ice Company v. Potter (1907) 7 CoL. L.
REV. 32, 34-4o; see also Ames, The Disseisinof Chattels (1890) 3 HARV. L. Rtv.
337-8.
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does it make to B whether he has to pay a sum of money to C or to A?
C has fulfilled his contract by services, etc., so nothing is left of the
personal equation argument. There is no objection, therefore, to
assignment. A contract right is in a broad sense "property", and
public policy favors the alienability of property. It is obvious therefore that in these cases we shall not be considering either benefit to
B or "dutiful intervention" by A in B's affairs, but only a permitted
matter of business between A and C. Since this is so, it would seem
as though A could never be called officious in taking an assignment
from C, either to supply values to B, or to demand values of B.13
The preliminary question whether A can legally and effectively "pay"
B's debt to C: There has been a long standing dispute whether a
tender by A and acceptance by C can operate per se as a discharge
or payment of B's debt to C, so as to prevent C from later suing B on
it. One series of decisions holds that it can, while another says there
can be no payment unless and until B ratifies. We are not required
for the advancement of our theme to take more than a summary view
of this dispute,14 but two important cases, 14a representing the view
that there is no payment until B ratifies, will bear discussion. In the
first of these, Neely v. Jones, all the details ef the argument are ably
and clearly stated. The results put concisely are:
(x) When A pays he may demand and receive from C a formal
assignment. B need not know or consent. It is a purchase
of the debt.
(2)
When A pays, C may expressly agree to assign the debt to him.
If so, and he yet fails to make formal assignment, equity nevertheless deems it an equitable assignment. B need not know or
consent. It, too, is a purchase of the debt.
13WooDwARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 56, thinks this might be officious in some
circumstances, but could rarely be inexcusably officious in regard to the purchase
and performance of a contract.
USee 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1857-1860. Williston's 'view, in
brief, is that the weight of American authority now says that C after accepting
A's tender cannot sue B. It is, strictly, only an accord and satisfaction-not a
legal discharge; but is a valid defence to B against C. Any additional evidence,
though slight, that the payment was made on B's behalf and was ratified by him
is gladly seized on by the courts. Thus there is little practical difference between
the two lines of decisions. New York, however, long followed the early and
strict English view. C's acceptance of A's payment may afford an equitable
defence, as C impliedly promises thereby perpetually to forbear to sue B. See
Snyder v. Pharo, 25 Fed. 398 (C. C. D. Del. 1885); Jackson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
66 N. J. L. 319, 49 Atl. 730 (igoi); Gray v. Herman, 75 Wis. 453, 44 N. W. 248
(1890);
(1894) 7 HARV. L. REv. 437.
i4aNedly v. Jones, 16 W. Va. 625 (I88O); Crumlish's Adm'r v. Cent. Improvement Co., 3 8 W. Va. 39o, 18 S. E. 456 (1893).
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(3)

When A pays, neither of the above may happen, there being a
mere tender and acceptance between A and C. Here the presumption is that A means that B shall repay him. There is no
express or implied agreement between A and C for an assignment. The real agreement is of a conditional and "dilatory"
character, so to speak. It is this:
(a) If B ratifies A's act as a payment, C will also so consider
it. Until B ratifies, the debt is paid as to C, but not as to B.
As between A and B the debt is still alive, and A may sue on it
in assumpsit as for money paid to C for B's use.
(b) If B repudiates, as he may, C cannot deem the tender and
acceptance to be payment even as to himself. Legal title
to the debt remains in C, and he can still sue B for it. C's
recovery would give him double payment, however, and A
would be without recourse against any one. The court, to
avoid this unjust result, will therefore deem C's agreement
with A to have been that, in the event B repudiates, C will
transfer the debt to A; and, enforcing this agreement, the
court will decree A to be the equitable owner of the debt.
The proceduralresults upon B's repudiation:(i) A sues B at law in
C's name for A's use. But if B now pleads A's payment as a discharge of the debt, A can sue B, still in law, for money paid to C at
B's request. Or instead of suing B in law, A can in the first place (2)
sue B in equity, A being the equitable owner of the debt. And if B
now pleads A's payment as a discharge of the debt, equity will
consider such plea as itself an admission of liability to refund to A
and will so decree to save multiplicity of actions.1 5
15While the reasoning of the case seems to run along well, there are logical
difficulties in the third paragraph of the outline of results in regard to its solution
of the question: Did the tender and acceptance pay the debt? The answer to this
question made in the case of Crumlish's Adm'r v. Central Improvement Co.,
supra note I4a, at 395, 18 S. E. at 457, was: "The answer depends on whether
you mean [paid] as to the creditor [C], or debtor [B]." But it is somewhat diffitult to see how a debt can thus exist "paid" as to C and unpaid as to B. Can
there be a debt without two parties, debtor and creditor? If paid as to one of
them, why is not the debt destroyed? B owed C only, and if C ceases to have
any right to enforce the debt, it being fully paid as to him, "it would seem,
according to plain common sense, that the obligation was extinguished and is no
longer in force as a contract", as .was said in Gray v. Herman, supra note 14, at
457, 44 N. W. at 249. Whether B ratifies or repudiates, in either case C cannot
enforce the debt against him. In Harrison v. Hicks, I Port. 423 (Ala. 1834),
the court says that payment of a debt, though made by one not a party to the
contract, and though the consent of the debtor to the payment does not appear,
is still the extinguishment of the demand. BISHOP, CONTRACTS (1887) § 211
states if payment "be accepted by the creditor in discharge of the debt, it has
that effect."
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Under the doctrine of Neely v. Jones"a, it is not perceived how A
could ever be thought inexcusably officious. He could not be under
the facts of paragraph one of the above outline." In this case A and
C together have the power to change B's legal relations by substituting A for C as B's creditor without B's knowledge or consent, and
even against his protest. As the law allows A to recover, it goes without saying that the law cannot regard A as officious. The same is
true under the conditions stated in paragraph two. Since equity
relieves A by making him an equitable assignee, equity cannot consider him officious. If equity regards him complacently, does it not
follow that the law should, or are we to be afflicted with two sorts of
officiousness, one in law and another in equity? But how does A
fare under paragraph three? Here, upon A's paying, the character
of his act and its potential effect upon the relations of all three
parties is yet undetermined, being dependent upon B's future action.
It is a sort of conditional payment to C for the time being. It is not
a payment at all as far as B is concerned, for he may repudiate it.
It becomes a payment as to all three parties if B ratifies. What B
does determines what C's action must be, and also what A's will be.
But whatever B does cannot make A officious. Suppose B repudiates.
That is the very contingency which will require C by his agreement
to transfer the debt to A in return for A's payment to him, and this
payment will now be regarded by equity, at least, as a satisfaction
of the debt, and equity will allow A, as equitable owner of the debt,
to have reimbursement of B. Of course, if B ratifies, officiousness
could not be thought of.
An important point concerns the lack of an agreement, either
express or tacit, for an absolute assignment under the facts of the
third paragraph of the outline. The court holds that this makes no
difference, in spite of the frequent assertions by courts that a stranger
paying the debt of another will not be subrogated to the creditor's
rights without an agreement to that effect.' 7 An analogous case is
mentioned, where A, a stranger, is requested by C, the creditor, to
guarantee B's debt to C. Here, A is not strictly a surety, since not
requested to act by B, the principal debtor. B may not even know of
A's act; yet A will be substituted to C's rights in spite of the fact that
he is a volunteer as far as B is concerned and was under no legal
obligation to make the contract with C. This shows that the right
of subrogation is based on natural justice, and not on contract.
n5aSupra note i4a.
7

1 STORY,

6

1

WoODWARD,

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

agreement is essential.

op. cit. supra note 7, § 56.

(14th ed.

1918)

§ 724, says an "express"
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Crumlish's Adm'r v. Central Improvement Co.'

a

follows the Neely

case. Both of these cases are specially approved by Pomeroy. s
In the Crumlish case, the defendant (B) was a judgment debtor of C.
C later attached some bonds of A, a railroad company, in which B
had an interest. A for its own business advantage wished to get hold
of the bonds and cancel them, to clear the way for a new bond issue.
A, therefore, offered to pay C the debt of B in return for the surrender
and transfer of the bonds to A. C accepted the offer and received
the agreed payment from A, whose action had been neither requested
nor ratified by B. It was held that A can recover from B. The court
said:sa "It remains a correct legal proposition to the present, that
one man, who is under no obligation to pay the debt of another,
can not without his request officiouslylsb pay that other's debt and
i7aSupranote I4a.
185 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 2335. How, then,
can Pomeroy, having approved these cases, say almost in the same breath:
"A mere stranger or volunteer paying the debt of another without request or
subsequent ratification is not entitled to indemnity from the latter [my italics]"?
The statement is further elaborated and his meaning made clear at § 1212, where,
in substance, he says that equity does not give every one subrogation who pays
another's debt. To get it, one must be so related to the subject or to the other
parties that his payment is not a purely voluntary act, but is equitably necessary
or proper as a means of securing his interests from injury. Therefore a mere
stranger who pays off a mortgage as a purely voluntary act can never be an
equitable assignee. He then explains this statement by the extremely obvious,
but quite inconclusive, truth that the volunteer cannot compel the mortgagee to
accept the payment, or having accepted it, compel him to assign the mortgageto him.
Continuing, he says that if the mortgagee consents both to accept and assign,
then it becomes an ordinary purchase of the mortgage, which can always be
effected with the mortgagee's consent, but never without this. So, in no case can
one voluntarily paying occupy the position of equitable assignee. The author's
meaning is that the' volunteer can never claim as a right to be subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee. Again, at § 2348 he says: "A mere volunteer, it is generally agreed, is never entitled to subrogation. The term is used to designate one
who, acting upon his own initiative, pays the debt of another without invitation,
compulsion, or the necessity of self-protection." The fault of this argument
and the answer to it is equally plain. It all depends upon what point of time you
choose to set for the real show to begin. It is idle to consider A's tender before
C accepts it. Of course A can't make C take it, and if C does not take it, there
could be no talk of "volunteer" or "payment". We, naturally, only care about
the case where C has accepted A's tender, and we wish to learn what A's rights
will then and thereafter be against B. Any dispute about them will come under
the third paragraph supra p. 212 (discussing the Neely case), where the court
very decidedly disagrees with Pomeroy and states that, if B repudiates A's
payment, then A will be decreed to be the equitable owner of the debt.
IsaSupra note I4a, at 395, 18 S. E. at 457.
,bItalics are the writer's.
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charge him with it." Later on, the court added"'c "and this Court,
while recognizing the rule that one can not officiously pay the debt
of another and sue him at law, unless he has ratified it, by allowing the
stranger to go into equity and get repayment makes the payment
in the eyes of a court of equity operate to satisfy the creditor, and
render the stranger a creditor of the debtor." This is just what was
held in Neely v. Jones, on which the main case relies. In the Neely
case, A was a sheriff who had had an execution issued to him and had
paid the judgment debt to the creditor out of his own pocket without
request or ratification by the judgment debtor. The court there regarded him just as any other stranger. It seems a fair conclusion to
draw from these cases that if a volunteer pays the debt unofficiously
he may recover in equity. Pomeroy, however, would have the rule to
be that a volunteer, in the sense of one who is not requested, or not
legally obligated or compelled by self-interest, can never be an
equitable assignee.
Taking these two cases together, it seems to the writer that they
mark an advance in the liberality of relief offered by equity. Under
these decisions, at least, can it any longer be taken as gospel truth
that one man may not substitute himself as a creditor of another
without his consent, even though he has no formal assignment from
the creditor or agreement with him for such? And how do these two
cases harmonize with the saying, "Equity will not aid a volunteer" ?"1
E. at 458.
19STORY, op. cit. supra note 17, § 723: "Volunteers or Intermeddlers Are Not

IScSupra note i4a, at 397, I8 S.

Entitled to Subrogation... The question as to who is a volunteer is not very
hard to determine. The right to invoke the equitable principle depends largely
upon the facts in a given case and whenever it appears that the third party has
paid the debt, which he was not responsible for and in which he had no interest,
.as a general rule he will lose what he has paid."
This rule, while because of its generality it seems to approach a somewhat
more liberal view, belongs on the whole to an older, and more strict and conr ervative type of thought, limiting A's right of access to this equitable relief
irather rigidly and narrowly by tests that may be termed mechanical. The following cases are believed to represent this view: Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kan. 495,
II Pac. 453 (1886), which holds that, to absolve A from being classed as a volunteer, stranger, or intermeddler in paying. B's debt to C, there must have been:
(i) a request from B or, that failing, some one of the following four substitutes:
(2) a legal or equitable assignment from C (not required by Neely v. Jones, supra
note i4a); (3)A must be a surety, or otherwise secondarily legally liable (this is
rejected by later cases of liberal tendency); (4) A's payment must have been
made to save his own actual or supposed right or interest; (s) some agreement
or understanding by B that A was to become the creditor. (Cf. suprap. 213).
See the following: Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Nay. & R. R., 81 U. S.
622 (1872) (no request; recovery denied); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport,
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I.B. A voluntarily pays .B's money debt to C, or renders B some other
service, and B subsequently promises A to reimburse him therefor: One
would suppose that this would be as clear a case of ratification or
adoption as could be found, and that no question could be made of
A's right to recover from B on plain quasi contractual principles.
However officious A might have been in conferring the benefit, B's
ratification, being equivalent to a previous request, ought to wipe
away all stain of that nature. As was said in Ingraham v. Gilbert,"sa
"The reasons why a debtor is not liable to repay to another a debt
which that other has voluntarily paid, entirely fail, when such debtor
afterward agrees to the payment and promises to remunerate him for
what he has done."
All courts would probably agree that, where A has unofficiously
benefited B, that fact alone imposes upon B a moral duty to repay.
But there is a difference of opinion as to whether such moral duty is a
sufficient support for B's subsequent express promise to reimburse.
The more liberal courts say it is; the stricter ones that it is not, but
that there must have been in the first place an antecedent legal
liability in B, which has later been suspended or barred by some
positive rule of law operating to extinguish the remedy but not the
debt, such as the statutes of limitation or of bankruptcy, or the bar
20
of infancy.
124 U. S. 534, 8 Sup. Ct. 625 (r888) (lacks all the above; recovery denied);
Suppiger v. Garrels, 20 Ill. App. 625 (I886) (says subrogation confined to where
[3] and [4] exist; recovery denied); Harrison v. Bisland, 5 Rob. 204 (La. x843)
(request by B; no obligation in A; recovery denied); Shinn v. Budd, 14 N. J. Eq.
234 (x862) (no request; no assignment; but obligation in A; recovery denied);
Gadsden v. Brown, i Speer, Eq. 41 (S. C. 1843). See also Winder v. Diffenderffer,
o
2 Bland 166, 199 (Md. 284 ) where there is no request, and recovery is denied.
The court says: "It is a well settled general rule, that no one can be allowed to
intrude himself upon another as his surety... [T]he only exception... is, where,
on a bill of exchange being dishonored, a third person, not a party to it, may pay
it for the honor of the drawer, or any of the endorsers. The reason of allowing
this exception is, that it induces the friends of the drawer or endorsers to render
them this service; and by that means preserves the honor of commerce, and the
credit of the trader." Opposed to the above cases, there are many, and it is
believed that it is a growing class which do not require that there shall be a
request by B, or that any of the mentioned substitutes shall be present. These
cases will be discussed under later headings.
19a2o Barb. 152, 153 (N. Y. 1855).
20

For a full note on this subject, see (1922) 17 A.L.R. 1299, 1359-1377. The
case of McMorris v. Herndon, 2 Bail. L. 56, 57 (S.C. 183o), 21 Am. Dec. 515,
516, well expresses the liberal view: "If a person pay money which another
was under a legal or moral obligation to pay, though without his knowledge
or request, the law raises an assumpsit; as in the case of goods distrained by the
commissioners of the land tax, if a neighbor should redeem the goods and pay
the tax he may maintain an action against the owner for the money so paid.
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I. c. A by mistake of law or fact pays B's debt, believing it to be his
own obligation: Under these circumstances there is no good reason
for considering A officious. The essence of officiousness is the
conscious purpose of interposing in another's affairs for his advantage. Here, there is nothing of this sort. A has no thought of
paying another's debt, but intends to pay his own. Moreover, in the
pursuit of such intention he is acting in conformity with what he
conceives to be both his right and his duty. That is not an officious
state of mind. If officiousness were a crime, A could not be conBacon. Abr. Assumpsit, D. [See Jenkins v. Tucker, i H. B1. 9o (1788).] ...
I
think the cases point to a distinction of this sort, which is probably the correct
one-where a person is under a legal obligation to pay money, and another
pays it for him without request, the law raises an implied assumpsit to refund
without any express promise on his part; but where he was not under any legal
obligatiion, but receives the benefit of any payment made, or labor done by another; as if a person see the fence of my field decayed, and out of kindness pay
another to repair it, and I promise to reimburse him; or if he repair it himself,
and I promise to pay him for his trouble, here the express promise is good."
The court cites Watson v. Turner, Bull. N. P. 129 (circ. 1767); Atkins v. Banwell, 2 East 505 (1802); Wennall v. Adney, 2 Bos. & P. 247 (1802).
Many of the following cases stress the benefit B has received as being alone
sufficient to support B's later promise to refund: Oakes v. Cushing, 24 Me. 313
(1844); Stuht v. Sweesy, 48 Neb. 767, 67 N. W. 748 (1896); Drake v. Bell, 26
Misc. 237, 55 N. Y. Supp. 945 (Sup. Ct. 1899) (good case to read); State of
Oregon ex rel Bayer v. Funk, IO5 Ore. 134, 209 Pac. 113 (1922), 25 A. L. R. 625,
635 (1923) (good case to read); Wright v. Farmers Nat. Bk., 31 Tex. Civ. App.
4o6, 72 S. W. 1O3 (1903).
In Bevan v. Tomlinson, 25 Ind. 253 (1865), the court cites 2 GREENLEAF,
op. ct. supranote 2, § 107: "where the act done is beneficial to the other party,
whether he was himself legally bound to have done it or not, his subsequent
express promise will be binding; and even his subsequent assent will be sufficient
evidence, from which the jury may find a previous request, and he will be bound
accordingly." The court says that this passage is not supported by the authorities cited, and that it does not believe it to be the law. It then at 255 quotes
what it says is the correct rule from i PARSONS, CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1864) 471,
and note "d": "... . Where one does voluntarily, and without request, that which
he is not compellable to do for another, who is compellable to do it, as if one
who is not a surety, or bound in any way, pays a debt due from another, he has
not the same claim and right as if he had been compelled to pay this debt."
Upon a little study it is seen that Greenleaf and Parsons are here talking about
two entirely different things, and that there is no contradiction in their statements which makes one necessarily right and the other necessarily wrong. All
that Greenleaf says is that it does not make any difference whether B was or
was not obligated to do the thing which A voluntarily did for him. All that is
important is that B was benefited and then later promised to repay A. It is not
stated whether A was obligated to act. Nothing at all is made to turn upon that.
The benefit is the important point.
Greenleaf's rule that B's assent, shown by his voluntary retention of the
benefit, is all that is needed for A to recover in these cases is, it is believed, the
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victed thereof for the lack of the necessary mens rea. There may be
reasons of public policy for deeming one a trespasser who enters on
another's land, though he be unaware that he has passed his own
boundaries, for there is in such a case some harm or loss entailed.
But public policy does not audibly call on the courts to punish A
when he by honest mistake pays B's debt. 21

A payment made by

such mistake, whether of law or of fact, is not in a true sense a voluntary payment, nor is the one making it rightly to be considered a
volunteer, much less an officious volunteer.
correct one. See Price v. Towsey, 3 Litt. 423 (Ky. 1823). If A was not officious,
and the act was useful and necessary to B, that is quite sufficient on quasi contractual principles for A's recovery. To go further and require that B must be shown
to have expressly or tacitly promised repayment, in other words, to require B's
ratification, is just as unnecessary as it is to require B's previous request for A's
act. Greenleaf's discarding of the necessity of B's being obligated to act is also,
it seems, quite correct; performance of another's duty is one way to benefit him,
but by no means the only way. See Part I, (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
25, "49et Seg.
Other cases on this subject, but leaning the other way, are: Greene v. The
First Parish in Malden, Io Pick. 499 (Mass. 1830); Chamberlain v. Whitford,
102 Mass. 448 (1869); Critcher v. Watson, 146 N. C. 150, 59 S. E. 544 (1907).
21
1n (19o8) 8 CoL. L. REv. 654, 655, the notewriter says: "It might seem that
the considerations of policy and of natural justice affecting a conscious intermeddler should not defeat a person who has acted under mistake. But from the
recipient's point of view, an unsolicited benefit is not changed in character
because dictated by mistake." But that is only to say that the benefit remains
unsolicited in spite of the mistake. There is a benefit, and if it was unofficiously
given, the rule against unjust enrichment has a clear field. The mistake should
rid A of officiousness in the eyes of the law, and it is the law's point of viewnot B's-that is to decide. The scales should tip toward A, for he has in good
faith given value to B. The latter cannot lose anything as long as his original
burden is not increased. These cases are well discussed in a note in (1910) 24
HARV. L. REV. 161, the writer advocating the equitable remedy of subrogation
where A has relied upon the authority of B's agent. He says, "In certain cases
where a stranger has satisfied the obligation of a debtor, equity, to prevent
unjust enrichment, will revive the obligation and enforce it for his benefit. But
where an attempt has been made to extend this doctrine beyond payments to
protect actual interests of the third party [i.e. A], or payments at the express
request of the debtor, many courts have stumbled over the maxim that equity
does not protect a volunteer... So too where the request was from one whom he
erroneously supposed to have authority. It is submitted, however, that if one
acts under a bona fide belief in a state of fact or law which, if true, would justify
the payment, he ought not to be regarded by equity as a mere-officious intermeddler. No new burden is created, and the debtor ought not to be allowed to
escape the old obligation at the expense of an innocent third party. This doctrine
is upheld by an increasing body of authority." See WooDwARD, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 161, where the same line of argument is adopted even in the case of
municipal corporations which have received A's money or services through the
unauthorized contracts of their agents.
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Distinctions made between mistakes of law and of fact: There are
cases which make this distinction in determining the question of A's
officiousness and his right to quasi contractual relief. One such case
is Millard v. D. L. & W. R. R.,21' where by mistake of law A paid B's
tax, erroneously assessed against A. N's plea was that, since his
payment was made by mistake, it could not be called "intrusive".
Judgment for B. The court said: "I do not understand that a mere
mistake as to a legal right or liability where one has knowledge or
means of knowledge of the facts will make such payment involuntary
or warrant a recovery, even though it be against conscience for the
defendant to retain its benefit." 2 A was allowed to prevail in ana
action at law in Iron City Tool Co. v. Long,O and in Govern v. Russ.21
The part taken by equity here: subrogation:This remedy is frequently
sought in mistake cases. A common case is where A, believing
himself to be the owner of land, pays the taxes or a mortgage debt.
Title is later decreed to be in B. The mistake is usually regarded as
one of law. The decisions swing back and forth, now for A, now for
B, the result being reached on various considerations, such as a
request or consent by B, inferred from his knowledge that A was
making the payments, especially if these payments were over a
considerable period; good faith of A; his duty to pay, believing as
he did; public policy in encouraging the payment of taxes; A's protection of his fancied rights and interests; the necessity of the payment. and its benefit to B; or, on the other hand, A's lack of care and
24
diligence.
la224

Pa. 448, 73 Atl. 904 (1909).

22b
1 d. 451, 73 Atl. at 905. For this

KEENER,

op. cit. supra note

2, at 85-112,

is 2cited. But Keener shows doubt of the validity of the distinction between mistakes of law and fact, and WOODWARD, op. cit. supranote 7, c. 3, after a thorough
historical review, rejects it as unsound, arbitrary, and unjust. He shows that
it originated in mistake and misconception, and that it has already begun to
give way both here and in England. Negligence in A, or his means of knowledge
should not defeat him if it has not led B to a change of position that would make
it inequitable to extend relief to A. The court admits that the "equities" are
with A, but says that his right to recover in quasi contract is a close question.
It intimates also that, if the mistake had been one of fact, A might have recovered.
234 Sadler 57 (Pa. 1886).
23a125 Iowa 188, IOO N. W. 325 (1904). Of this case, the notewriter in (19o8)
8 COL. L. REv. (cited supra note 21) at 655 says: "this is a very questionable
exception to the ordinary case of the discharge of any liability by a stranger."
He says that only a few jurisdictions allow such recoupment in quasi contract.
24
The following are some cases allowing subrogation where the mistake is one
of law: Kemp v. Cosart, 47 Ark. 62, 14S. W. 465 (1885) (dispute as to ownership;
payment of the taxes necessary and beneficial to B); Goodnow v. Moulton, 51
Iowa 555, 2 N. W. 395 (1879) (dispute as to ownership); Kelly v. Duff, 61 N. H.
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In Walker v. Walker,n the widow, who had paid off a debt which
was a-lien on the land, had no notion of being subrogated to the rights
of the creditor, and the court therefore held that she was a volunteer.
435 (1881) (A thinks he has an interest); Coudert v. Coudert, 43 N. J. Eq. 407,
5 Atl. 722 (1886); Capehart v. Mhoon, 58 N. C. 178 (1859) (A negligently thinks
he is surety); Brewer v. Nash, I6 R. I. 458, 17 Atl. 857 (1889) (A buys land under
void power of sale, the money going to pay B's debt; B keeps the money after
he learns the facts; held that A is not a mere stranger). In Harrisonv. Harrison,
r49 Tenn. 6ox, 259 S. W. 9o6 (1924), a widow, ignorant of law and business,
had homestead and dower rights to preserve. She paid her husband's debts
which were liens on the land. The court said: "The equitable remedy of subrogation is by no means confined to those personally bound on the obligation",
and cited 5 POMEROY, op. cit. supranote x8, § 2344, where those entitled to this
relief are divided into three classes: "First, those who act in performance of a
legal duty, arising either by express agreement or by operation of law; second,
those who act under the necessity of self-protection; third, those who act at
the request of the debtor, directly or indirectly, or upon invitation of the
public, and whose payments are favored by public policy." The court also
quotes from Walker v. Walker, 138 Tenn. 679, 681, 200 S. W. 825 (1918) where
the court, after stating the formula that a volunteer is not entitled to subrogation, continues: "It is probable that all that is meant by the general rule is that,
if a volunteer pays the debt of a third party, although it is a Hen upon property,
with the intention of extinguishing the debt, and is not induced thereto by
fraud, accident, or mistake, or by contract with the payee, he is not entitled
to subrogation." This seems to mean that where A pays, intending to make a
a gift of the debt, and in that case only, he is not entitled to subrogation.
Cases denying subrogation where the mistake is one of law are: Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Nay. and R. R., supra note ig; Garrigan v. Knight, 47
Iowa 525 (1877) (A had no reason to make the mistake; was negligent; held
"officious and an intermeddler"); Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49 (1885); Norton v.
Highleyman, 88 Mo. 621 (1886).
Cases allowing subrogation where the mistake is one of fact are: City of Chicago
v. C. & N. W. Ry., 186 Ill. 300, 57 N. E. 795 (19oo); Bateson v. Phelp's Estate,
145 Mich. 605, io8 N. W. 1079 (19o6) (recovery denied in law, but equitable
recourse suggested); Sampson v. Mitchell, 125 Mo. 217, 28 S. W. 768 (I894);
Hotchkiss v. Williams, 44 App. Div. 615, 6o N. Y. Supp. 168 (2d Dept. 1899);
Williams v. Williams, 2 Dev. Eq. 69 (N. C. 1831) (A, administrator, paid estate's
debts from own resources; held not to be officious, emphasis being placed on the
necessity of the act, the motive, and the benefit to B); Kershaw County v.
Town of Camden, 33 S. C. 140, Il S. E. 635 (I89O); Walker v. Walker, supra.
Contra: Evans v. Halleck, 83 Mo. 376 (1884). In the last named case A, an
administrator, paid in advance of the court's order, a debt of the estate. Here,
just as in Williams v. Williams, supra, A believed mistakenly that the personal
property of the estate would be enough to reimburse him. The court held that
A paid at his own risk and had misappropriated the funds of the estate. Other
claims outranked the one paid. See a note on subrogation in these cases in
(19o9) 58 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 328; also the very able note in (1907) 5 L. R. A.
(N.

s.) 838.

nSupra note 24.
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But it also held that, as the doctrine of subrogation is steadily expanding in its practical administration so as to embrace all cases where
complete justice cannot be done without it, she was entitled to this
remedy.
I. D. A by mistake of law orfact does B's work, thinking it is his own:
The principles stated in the last section control here as well. It is
immaterial whether B owes money or work to C; subrogation should
work equally well in either case. If B was doing the work for himself, A's beneficial interference therewith takes on the aspect of improvements made on another's property. In Columbus, Hocking
Valley &' Toledo Ry. v. Gaffney,26 A did B's work, thinking it to be a
part of his own job, for which he received a stated wage from the
government. Presumably, B knew that A was doing its work. A had
done this for six years intending, naturally, to charge no one for it
beyond what he was already being paid. The work was done under a
mistaken sense of duty, and, rightly enough, the court does not
even suggest officiousness in A, or that he was a volunteer. The case
was decided on the point that A had brought his action in contract,
and as the facts showed none could have existed because of A's
lack of intent to charge B, relief was denied27 . This does scant justice
2665 Ohio St. 104, 61 N. E. 152 (1901).
27
A similar case is Johnson v. Boston, etc. R. R., 69 Vt. 521, 38 Atl. 267 (1897),
where it was B's duty by contract with the government to transfer mail at a
certain point. B had failed to do this, and A, mistakenly thinking it his duty
to the government, made the transfers. Instead of deciding the case on the ground
taken in the Gaffney case, supra note 26, the court goes further and says at 527,
38 Atl. at 270: "But he [A], thinking that it might be his duty to make them
[i.e. the transfers], voluntarily proceeded to perform such service... There was
no such necessity for the plaintiff's interference... In this view of the case, he
[Al must be taken to be an officious volunteer, and therefore precluded from
recovering." It seems a remarkable conclusion that A was officious as to B
when A performs what he thinks is his mere duty to C and intends to charge B
nothing for the work. Moreover, B was in at least equal fault in not knowing
the terms of his contract with the government. B negligently does less than his
duty requires, and A in good faith does more while B stands by and allows A
to do his (B's) work, and yet it is considered that B should prevail! There is
also a public interest here to throw into the balance.
An opposite result fortunately was reached in Blowers v. So. Ry., 74 S. C.
221, 54 S. E. 368 (1906), and McClary v. Michigan, etc. R. R., 102 Mich. 312,
6o N. W. 695 (1897). See also Grossbier v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 173
Wis. 503, 181 N. W. 746 (1921). Here the facts were similar, except that A did
not believe that doing B's work was his duty, at least he was uncertain about
this and did the work grumblingly and under protest, and intending to be paid
for doing B's work. Here the court holds that B was bound to know the terms
of his own contract with the government. It made no difference that B did not
expect to pay A, since B knew that A was doing the work and had insisted upon
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to A because of the narrow ground of decision. No doubt had
entered A's mind as to his duty here, so that he could not be considered to have done B's work merely out of policy. In such a case,
it might be proper to say that A had "taken his chances". This
was the thought of the court in some of the cases in the last section,
where there was a lively dispute between A and B as to who was the
rightful owner of the property on which A voluntarily paid taxes
while the court's decision was pending. But even in such a case, it
would hardly be proper to call A officious. One should be allowed to
protect any interest he may reasonably suppose himself to have, or
even the "sporting chance" of an interest.
A's doing it. The court says at 5o9, 18I N. W. at 748: "In doing this work
plaintiff was not a volunteer, nor was he acting officiously... [Hiewasperforming duties in which the public were interested, and under the circumstances
he very properly continued to do more than his contract required."
In Rohr v. Baker, 13 Ore. 350, IO Pac. 627 (1886), A, a contractor, mistakenly
supposing he was performing his own contract, excavated some earth in a part
of a street which B, another contractor, had contracted to excavate. The court,
denying relief to A, said at 352, IO Pac. at 627: "The case presented is that of
a stranger doing work on Baker's contract without Baker's consent. The case,
in principle, is the same as though he had ploughed Baker's field, or done work
on his house, under similar circumstances." As far as equity is concerned A's
case seems a good one. Bright v. Boyd, i Story 478 (U. S. 1841) gives A compensation for permanent improvements to lands under mistake of title. True,
recovery in quasi contract has been denied in such cases: Welsh v. Welsh, 5
Ham. 425 (Ohio, 1835); but see Clark v. Davidson, 53 Wis. 317, io N. W. 384
(1881), and KEENER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 369, where in substance he says
there is no sufficient reason for denying A a recovery at law in such cases. "While
it is true that the plaintiff did not intend to benefit the defendant, the fact is
that he did." The basis of recovery here is unjust enrichment. Ibid. 370, 379,
385, 386.
State v. St. Johnsbury, 59 Vt. 332, IO Atl. 531 (1887) seems to be a mistake
of law case. The village of St. Johnsbury claimed in good faith to be entitled
to recover fines and costs for offenses under the Vermont liquor law, but these
were in fact payable to the state. The village prosecuted several of these cases
as its own expense. This was the state's attorney's business, but he and the
state auditor knew what the village was doing and did not object. Held, that
the village could not keep the money collected nor charge the state with the
costs of collecting it. The court says at 341, IO Atl. at 535: "If one undertakes
my business claiming it to be his own, and therein makes expenditures, I am
not liable to him therefor, although he has advantaged me thereby. This is
so even when one undertakes my business for me, and on my behalf, without
my request, express or implied, and benefits me; for his services are gratuitous.
One cannot thrust himself upon me, and make me his debtor, whether I will
or not." This is a clear denial that the Roman law principle of negotiorum gestio
has any place in English law. There is no obligation conceivable outside of
strict contract, nor does the court allow anything to mistake and good faith.
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I.E. A, relying upon the authority of B's supposed agent, renders
money or service values to B: Here, unlike the cases in the preceding
section, A does not think he is paying his own debt or doing his own
work, but believes he is giving values to B upon B's request that he
should intervene in his affairs. The principles that should here
govern the question of A's officiousness or the voluntariness of his
conduct are in nowise different from the other mistake cases already
shown, and nothing would be gained by a further consideration of
these agency cases. Woodward well remarks28 that "so long as the
plaintiff's enrichment of the defendant is the result of honest mistake
and not of malicious interference with the defendant's affairs, there is
no harm in compelling restitution."
On the whole, it seems that, while there is some desultory talk of
officiousness in these mistake cases, the courts in general have instinctively (or perhaps upon full consideration) felt that these are
cases where that term cannot properly be used.
H. A performs B's contract with C: Examination has shown the
aversion that the common law has to A's paying B's debt to C.2 9
If A cannot do this unofficiously, there is equal reason to suppose
that he cannot perform B's contract with the law's approval, provided he does this under all the limitations stated for the debt cases.30
As far as theory goes, the two things seem to be upon the same plane
and to require an application of the same principles. The actual
decisions thoroughly justify this conclusion by overwhelmingly
denying A the right of recovery where he intervenes to perform B's
contract. Nor do we find that in this field equity takes the important part it assumed in the debt cases.
We are here considering only those contracts between B and C in
which, according to present estimates, the public has but a slight
interest, either in the subject matter thereof, or the promptness
32
of their performance. 31 There is the difficulty, already alluded to,
80p.

cit. supra note 7, § 72. For enforcement of restitution in cases of ultra
vires contracts of municipal corporations, see ibid. § 161; and for such contracts
of private corporations, see ibid. §§ 154-i6o. For instances of where a subordinate
agent of a railroad calls in a physician to attend one whom the railroad has
injured, see ibid. § 201. For unauthorized borrowings by school directors, see
2

infra p. 232-233.
29

Supra p. 205 et seg.
3OSupra p. 205.
3"WooDwARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 209: "The prompt discharge of a contractual obligation is not ordinarily a matter of grave public concern. As a rule,
therefore, the default of a contractor will not warrant the intervention of a
stranger to the contract." KEENER, op. it. supra note 2, at 351, agrees.
nSupra Part I (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25, 47 et seg.
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of measuring public interest in any given case. Suppose that B has
made a contract with C to mend his decaying fences, or to gather and
store his hay crop, or to attend his cow which lies sick with a colic,
and that B defaults in each case. Suppose further that A is the only
man willing, able, and available in the neighborhood to do these
jobs. In which, if any, of these situations is the public interest
strong enough to dispense with B's consent (privity of contract) and
justify A's interference, C himself being absent and the need for
action pressing? There is the other difficulty, already pointed out,3
of harmonizing and properly weighing these three factors of public
interest, B's obligation, and benefit to B. There is the theoretical
danger of so over-stressing public interest that the true quasi contractual guage-benefit to B-is lost to view, and the whole case
lifted out of quasi contract. Isnot B benefited by A's performance
of his private contractual obligation, as well as if it were an obligation
which the public wants performed, or has the performance of a legal
obligation ceased to be a benefit in these cases? Why should equity
not lend itg help to A, as long as it does so in cases of debt payment
irrespective of any benefit B may have from the payment? Since in
debt cases it is the creditor's rights that seem to govern, it would
seem logical and proper in these contract cases, that if C wants A
to perform B's contract and is satisfied with A's performance, A
should be subrogated to C's rights against B, the defaulter. Confining
C to the remedy of an action against B for breach of contract may be
a poor remedy or no remedy at all, and specific performance, even if
available, may be too slow. Or to take another angle, suppose in the
three cases just suggested that C has not contracted with B or any
one else to render these services, but that A, chancing by, sees the
pressing need, and no one else being at hand, renders the service.
There is no want of courts which would allow a recovery, and some
cases already considered in this paper have said it would not be a
4
trespass for A to go upon C's property to perform the service
Why should unrequested interference with B's contract be discouraged any more than unreqttested interference with C's property?
After all, privity of contract hag nothing to do with the case, though
everything seems to be made of it.
II.A. A performs B's contract with C, the public having a vital
interest in its prompt performance: We here widen the scope of A's act
by removing one of the limitations imposed. 35 A's act is now, we are
supposing, one of public interest. It has had, in this particular
3Su1W.

20i5

I-'SUPrap. 205.
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instance, little effect. So insistent is the continued demand that
privity of contract be the only door to proper intervention when the
thing intervened in is itself a contract, that even grave public interest
has had to yield place to it, A few cases, however, have opposed the
flood. One such is the early New York case of Forsyth V. Ganson,31
where B was bound by contract to support C for life, and upon his
failure to do so, A, a son of C, fulfilled the contract. The court
denied the need for privity between B and A and based its decision
on the ground that the performance of his legal duty was a benefit to
B, from which the law would raise his promise to repay A. This case
seems not to have been followed in New York or elsewhere,37 sound as
it is in principle. Indeed, a later New York case, on the same facts,
held A could not recover because of his lack of privity.8 No mention
is made in these cases of A's being officious or a volunteer, no doubt
because the courts thought that lack of privity was an amply sufficient
reason for their decisions.
1I.B. Under assignmentfrom C, A performs C's contract with B:
Probably the most prominent of this type of cases is Boston Ice Co. v.
Potter.39 The facts of this celebrated case are too well known to
need restatement here.40 Quite similar is the case of Boulton v.
2'5 Wend. 558 (N. Y. 1830).
37

This case is followed somewhat half-heartedly by Rundell v. Bentley, 53
Hun 272, 6 N. Y. Supp. 609 (3d Dept. 1889), the court saying that B knew all
along that A was performing his contract, and that the jury were therefore

justified in inferring B's request or consent, i.e. the court reaches after a contract.
So3 also Hunter v. Felton, 61 Vt. 359, 17 Ati. 739 (1889).
SCase v. Case, 2o3 N. Y. 263, 96 N. E. 44o (1911), where there was a sealed
contract, and the court made much of that fact. Of course, if it be true that
quasi contract, and not contract, is the basis of recovery, it can make no difference
whether the contract acted upon by A was sealed or unsealed. Moody v. Moody,
14 Me. 307 (x837) shows the same facts, and a sealed contract. No emphasis
was laid on the seal, but merely on the lack of privity. See Mathney v. Chester,
141 Ky. 790, 133 S. W. 754 (1911) (recovery denied for same reason); Savage

v. McCorkle, 17 Ore. 42, 21 Pac. 444 (1888) (same facts; unsealed contract;
recovery denied for same reason). In Lockwood v. Smith, 81 Misc. 334, 143 N.Y.
Supp. 480 (Sup. Ct. 1913), B was bound by unsealed contract to support C
for life, and to bury him. A claims under the undertaker who bore the burial
expenses. Recovery was denied on the ground that there must be not only a
contract, but A or the undertaker must be made a third party beneficiary of it,
just as in Lawrence v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268 (1859). There was no legal duty from
C to A here, the court says, since C was under no duty to A to preserve enough
of his property to pay his funeral expenses. For the different views entertained
by Woodward and Keener in regard to these cases, see supra Part I (1929)
15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25, 48, n. 56.
39123
40

Mass.

28 (1877).

op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 54-56, comments on it at length; also
op. cit. supra note2, at 36o-361. See also an interesting and full analysis

WOODWARD,

KEENER,
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Jones,41 except that here A was in the employ of C when he (A) took
the assignment of the' contract to supply B, and B had a set-off
against C, and also there had been no ill feeling between B and A
before the assignment, as in the Potter case. Woodward2 thinks the
value of the goods above the set-off is clearly recoverable, for the defendant must have expected to pay for that part, "and it can hardly
be said that the plaintiff acted officiously in the premises." In
Barnes v. Shoemaker,4 the facts were practically the same as in the
Boulton case, but here A, in performing the assigned contract to
supply books to B, sent along with the goods a letter telling B how
the order came to be filled by him. B omitted to read the letter
at the time, and later finding out that A had sent the books, refused
to pay for them. The court held that B must pay, but added that it
would have been otherwise if A had not sent the informative letter
with the books. This last statement seems wrong: A would not have
acted officiously had he omitted to inform B of the facts, and as B was
of thecasebyCostigan, op. cit. supranote 12, at 43, who there says: "Undoubtedly
the inexcusable officiousness of plaintiff is always a defense in our law to a claim
of quasi-contract liability, but is it true that one who in good faith believes
himself to be assignee of an express contract and entitled to perform thereunder,
and who out of consideration for the other party's feelings conceals his claims
to be assignee, is to be rated as so officious that he has no equity against the one
who has received and consumed satisfactory goods furnished in fulfilment of
the contract? It cannot be true.. ." The Potter case itself does not mention
officiousness, and Keener, alone of the writers just mentioned, thinks A was
officious in not informing B of the assignment before supplying him with ice.
He thinks A.should have done so because of B's quarrel with A before the assignment. The other two writers think A deserved commendation for this concealment under the circumstances.
412H. & N. 564, 27 L. J. Exch. II7 (1857).
4
2op. cit. supra note 7, § 58. See ibid. § 56, where Woodward says that: "the
mere fact that A is persona non grata, or that for some other reason B does not
wish to deal with him, is insufficient, without other evidence, to convict A of
officious meddling. Knowledge of B's feeling, on the part of A, must also be
shown, and even then the proof may not be conclusive. Let it be supposed, for
example, that A is aware of B's feeling, but confers the benefit in performance
of a contract, believed to be valid, between B and C, of which he is the assignee.
Is A guilty of officiousness? Under some circumstances, no doubt, it would be
an impertinence for A to acquire by assignment a contract with B, who, to his
knowledge, does not wish to deal with him. Under other circumstances, as for
instance where the assignment of the contract is involved in the sale of a business
or is taken in satisfaction of a debt, the act would be entirely free from impropriety. Rarely, it is believed, would it be fair to regard the purchase and
performance of the contract by A as conduct so inexcusably officious as to justify
B in refusing to make restitution." See KEENER, op. cit. supranote 2, at 358-36o.
41I12 Ind. 512, 14 N. E. 367 (1887).
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benefited and expected to pay, he could not have retained the books
justly without paying for them."
III. A by expenditure of time and laborsaves B's property:Just as
in the case where A pays B's money debt to C, 41 it will aid clearness to
state the limitations or conditions under which the ,act is done. In
this case, these are the conditions: (a) A means to benefit B; (b) A
means that B shall repay him; (c) there is no actual prior request
for the service, or actual ratification or subsequent express promise of
reimbursement by B; (d) A saves (keeps, or repairs) the property
voluntarily, and not by (i) mere unconscious inadvertence, or (2)
mistake of fact, thinking it to be his own property, or (3)mistake of
law, thinking he is legally liable to save or preserve it at his own
expense, or (4) necessity of self-protection or the urge of self-interest,
or (5)the invitation of public interest.
This is one of the occasions when A may "dutifully intervene"
in B's affairs," and it is the one occasion where the English law seems
44
See Mudge v. Oliver, i Allen 74 (Mass. 1861); WOODWARD, op. cit. supra
note 7, §§ 54-5; Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HARV. L. REV. ii9;

and comment by Costigan, op. cit. supra note 12, at 42, n. 3, to the effect that,
where A has not been "really very bad" in his enrichment of B, he may recover
in a number of states including Massachusetts. The language of the court in
the Shoemaker case, supranote43, at 514,14 N. E. at 368, seems far too strong for
the ordinary assignment situation: "The right of a party to select his own patrons
or to determine with whom he will deal, cannot be frustrated by a mere interloper who fills an order never sent to or intended for him, without the knowledge
or consent of the person to whom the goods are supplied." Pittsburg Plate Glass
Co. v. MacDonald, 182 Mass. 593, 66 N. E. 415 (1903) is distinguishable fromthe
foregoing cases, in that here B received no benefit from A's act, and in addition,
B had warned A beforehand not to do the work. Note that B's protest after A
has done the work and after B has claimed the goods is useless. Orcutt v. Nelson,
I Gray 536 (Mass. 1854); Chase v. Corcoran, io6 Mass. 286 (1871); Randolph
Iron Co. v. Elliott, 34 N. J. L. 184 (1870); Belfield v. National Supply Co., 189
Pa. 189, 42 Atl. 131 (1899) (here B knew that A was the seller before he actually
received the goods); Wellauer v. Fellows, 48 Wis. 105, 4 N. W. 114 (1879). Cahill
v. Hall, I6I Mass. 512, 37 N. E. 573 (1894) and Schmaling v. Thomlinson, 6
Taunt. 147 (I815) are also distinguishable, since in each case A was denied
recovery because he already had a recourse against C, who had employed him
to do the work.
4Supra p. 205.
4
6WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 197: "The preservation of another's
property may be regarded as dutiful if it appears that the danger to the property
is so imminent that notice probably cannot be given to the owner in time to
enable him to take the necessary steps to preserve it." KEENER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 354: "If ... when the service was rendered, it was the intention of
the plaintiff to receive compensation for the service rendered, it would seem that
the plaintiff could, in no sense, be said to be an officious volunteer in charging
the defendant for the preservation of property which would have been destroyed
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to come nearest to the principle of negotiorum,gestio in the Roman
law. Here, simple benefit to B is unmixed with other possible factors
of decision and perforce becomes determinative. There is no legal
obligation on B to save his property, if we exclude any public interest
in the matter; there is no contract or debt; and there is no chance for
subrogation, if A does the work alone and does not hire a third
person to do it, as in Hoover v. Epler.47 For the sake of clearness we
will divide the cases under the following headings, giving consideration under each to certain modifying circumstances:
i. Cases where public interest in the saving of B3's property has not
entered into the court's decision: At the outset we presuppose that A
neither knows nor has reason to know that B would not wish the
property to be preserved.
(a) Cases allowing recovery: In Nicholson v. Chapman,48 A finds B's
timber, which was washed up by the tide, and carries it to safety.
The court sees no officiousness in A, saying: "This is a good office,
and meritorious, at least in the moral sense of the word, and certainly
intitles the party to some reasonable recompense from the bounty,
if not from the justice of the owner; and of which, if it were refused, a
court of justice would go as far as it could go, towards enforcing the
payment.

So it would if a horse had strayed, and ...was taken up

by some good-natured man and taken care of by him, till at some
trouble, and perhaps at some expense, he had found out the owner."
Notice that the court does not conclusively presume that A intended a
gift of the service, although the property was in instant danger of
being lost, and there was therefore an "emergency". 49 Chase v.
but for his intervention. It must be admitted, however, that the right of recovery is denied by the weight of authority." (This was written in 1893.) BIsHoP,
op. cit. supra note 15, § 236: "The duty to save the property of a third person
is so absolute that he who does it in an emergency when otherwise it would be
lost, not in mere voluntary kindness, but expecting to be paid, can recover from
the owner compensation for his outlay or labor, on a contract created by law."
See Heilman, The Rights of a Volunteer Agent against his Principalin Roman
Law and in Anglo-American Law (1926) 4 TENN.L. REv. 34, 83.
4752 Pa. 522 (1866), where A, the servant in charge of B's horse, acting outside of his contract, hadC shoe the horse and paid the bill with his own money.
Held, that A was subrogated to C's rights. The facts that weighed with the court
were that the act was necessary and that the benefit of it all went to the owner
and none to A. If A had done the work himself, he should have been able to
recover in his own right on the same principle.
482 H. Bl. 254, 258 (1793).
4
1See supra note 46, where Bishop sees in an "emergency" a proper place for
A to act-not for the court to presume that he meant a gift. See supra Part I
(1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25, 36, 38.
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Corcorani0 follows the preceding case and is essentially the same in
principle. The court in more definite terms stated that, when B
retook his property from A, B's promise would be implied by law to
repay A the necessary expenses of preserving it. No officiousness or
gift is seen, and it is an emergency case. In Reeder v. Anderson's
Adm'rs,51- A apprehends and restores B's runaway slave. The court
sa d that while such friendly offices were frequently intended as a
gift, nevertheless there is an implied request from the owner to all
other persons to secure to him the lost property he is anxious to retrieve, and there should be an implied undertaking to indemnify
another for his costs in so doing.5"
Two cases are of special interest. One is In re Bryant's Estatew,
where A had been agent and adviser of B. B died suddenly, and
without known heirs, thus leaving A in sole charge of the estate.
By the death of his principal it must be true that whatever A did in
carrying on was done as an "uncommissioned agent" in the exact
situation of the "negotiorumgestor in the Roman law. The court
said"a that A was left "in charge and quasi possession as an agent
5
OSupra note 44. It is noteworthy that B protested after A had done the work.
It availed him nothing. See Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, supra note 39; see supra
note 44.
514 Dana 193 (Ky. 1836).
52
Like cases are: Armory v. Flynn, io Johns. 102 (N. Y. I813), and Watts v.
Ward, I Ore. 87 (1854), where A intervened to save B's property (geese and
horses) and was allowed his expenses of preservation. Slightly different are cases
where B's property is cast upon A's land by wind or wave and A merely lets it
stay there. Such a case is Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 Barb. 368 (N. Y. 1864),
a'd, 42 N. Y. 484 (1870). A was allowed all damages and expenses when B
retook his logs, but the court distinguished this from cases where A renders
voluntary service, adding that A in such cases can recover nothing. Of course A
does not intervene at all here. Another type is shown in Preston v. Neale, 12
Gray 222 (Mass. 1858), where B, an outgoing tenant, leaves his trunks without
any agreement on the hands of A, an innkeeper. The court likened the case to
where goods are found, or where they are deposited by wind or flood. The same
facts appear in Moline, Milburn & Stoddard v. Neville, 52 Neb. 574, 72 N. W.
854 (1897). In the three last cases A may be said to be an "involuntary bailee".
In the last two, anyway, where A could easily have'removed the property, can
it not be said that by voluntarily keeping it after knowledge of its presence
he voluntarily intervened to preserve it? Here the language of an old authority
is pertinent: "... [T]hough a man waive the possession of his goods, and saith he
forsaketh them, yet by the law of the realm the property remaineth still in him,
and he may seise them after when he will. And if any man in the mean time put
the goods in safeguard to the use of the owner, I think he doth lawfully, and that
he shall be allowed for his reasonable expensesin that behalf, as he shall beof goods
found." SAINT GERMAINE, DOCTOR AND STUDENT (Muchall's i8thed. 1815) c. 5I.

5i8o Pa. 192, 36 Atl. 738 (1897).
afbid. 195, 36 Atl. at 738.
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without a known principal, and therefore with at least a moral duty
to look after the property for the real owner whoever he might
prove to be." In the other case, Beckwith v. Frisbie,4 A, a private
carrier, contracted to carry B's goods to New York. A freeze held
up the transportation, and A stored the goods to preserve them.
No such contingency had been foreseen by either A or B. Held,
that it was A's "duty" to store the goods, and that equity demands
that B repay A the storage costs, as it benefited B's property and
did not advantage A. This, too, fully exemplifies the Roman doctrine.

55

(b) Cases denying recovery: It has been said that the weight of
authority denies recovery. 6 If true, this is doubtless only true because of the "irrebuttable presumption" of a gift indulged in by
the courts.5 7 Other cases so decide because there is no contract, 8
or because A has forced his service, or for other reasons, some justifiable, others not.
2. Cases where the public might well be held to have an interest in the
saving of B's property: (a) Slave cases: In Dunbar v. Williams,5" A, a
Vt. 559 (i86o).
"The principal [dominus negotifl was bound to make good to the negotiorum
gestor all expenditure properly incurred by him for the other's benefit, and to
relieve him from all obligations reasonably undertaken in the course of his management." But if the expenditure was not beneficial, it could not be reclaimed by
the gestor. MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ROmAN LAW (3d ed.
532
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439, and n. 3. The gestor can recover only his actual costs and expenses
and interest on the outlay from the date of expenditure. MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN LAW (Dropsie ed. 1883) 373. If the common law allows
more than this, it goes beyond the Roman law. In salvage cases under our law,
and in general throughout the law of quasi contracts, the right to recover depends
upon benefit actually conferred. In maritime salvage an unsuccessful attempt
to save warrants no recovery. WooDwARD,op. cit. supranote 7, § 206 and p. 324,
n. 3. So, it appears, in the cases of saving property on land, that, if the owner
disclaims his property, he need not pay A for saving or keeping it. Chase v.
Corcoran, supra note 44. But there is one case where an attorney was allowed
to recover for services in the attempt to secure the release olf one from an insane
asylum, the services being faithfully and intelligently performed, though unsuccessfully. Lyon v. Minor, I74 Mich. 114, i4o N. W. 517 (1913); ANN. CAS.
1915 A, 726. In the Roman law, the principal must repay useful expenditures,
"though in the event they may have come to no good" the measure of repayment
would be the benefit at the time to the principal, not the cost to the gestor.
1921)

BUCKLAND,

A TExT-]BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROu AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (1921)

535.
6
Supra note 46.
57
See WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 207; see also supra Part I (1929) 15
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25,

36, 38.

58So the case of Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Ins. Co., 34 Ch. D. 234 (1886).
59
Io Johns. 249 (N. Y. 1813).
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physician, attended upon a slave of B's, at the slave's request but not
at B's, who knew nothing of A's act till it was done. There was no
emergency. The illness was slight, there was time enough to consult
B before doing anything, and B was presumably ready to do what it
was his duty to do. So, although it was a benefit to B to have his
slave treated, it was not a necessary act, nor was A reasonable in
performing it as he did. Recovery was denied.6" Another slave
case is Force v. Haines.61 The facts are important since they recur in
other cases involving the care of domestic animals and have caused
doubt and discussion. In the Force case, B rented a slave to A for a
stated period. At the end of the period A tendered back the slave to
B, who refused to receive her or to pay for her maintenance. The
slave was old, infirm, and helpless.62 A therefore took care of her
for some years, but the court refused to allow- A to recover from
B. We omit discussion of the various grounds given for the ruling3
and will consider one only, viz., that B had positively refused to
pay for the slave's maintenance before A undertook this. This
is the "against the teeth" argument. But here there is public interest
in a human life arrayed on the other side. The human being is,
by the mores then in f6rce, also a mere chattel, the property of B.
A's case, it seems to the writer, can be made out from the following
considerations. Not forcing the moral argument that the slave is a
human being, but taking her as merely a piece of property, it may
then follow that B is under no obligation to preserve his property,
and if he is known to A to be thus unwilling, it would be officious for
A to preserve it for him with the intention of charging him. But,
admitting this, it does not follow that B can force A to keep his
property for nothing. If B does not want his property, B, not A,
is the one bound to make some proper disposition of it. B cannot
place that burden upon A by merely refusing a responsibility that is
B's. Here B was under an obligation to resume possession of the
slave at the end of the bailment period. He refused to take her,
thus leaving her on the hands of A, who is now in the position of an
involuntary bailee, and made such by B's wrong. Has B any right
0

' KEENER,

WOODWARD,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 348, styles A an "officious volunteer". See
op. cit. supra note 7, § 195.

6117 N. J. L. 385 (184o).
62
Cf. Rundell v. Bentley, supra note 37, where the age and infirmity of the
person B had contracted to support weighed with the court in justifying A's
intervening to perform B's pontract.
3

6 KEENER,

op. cit. supranote 2, at 346, answers the arguments of the court and

insists that this case is quite the same in principle as where a husband wrongfully
abandons wife or child and A provides them with necessaries.
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to suppose that A consents thereafter to keep the slave without
cost to B, simply by virtue of his denial in advance that he will pay
for such keep? It is a strange legal argument that says one may get
rid of an obligation by a full organ-toned denial that he will be
bound by it, and a stranger one that he may by such procedure
dictate for another person a particular line of conduct which he
thinks will be favorable for him. A is in forced possession and is
therefore a "proper person" to intervene in B's affairs. B can at
any time he sees fit to do his duty stop the expense. A is not forcing
service upon B, but B has forced a responsibility on A that he should
have shouldered himself.
(b) Animal cases: In Mathie v. Hancock," A was in charge of B's
horses. B died suddenly, and A continued to care for the horses
until an administrator was appointed. The Vermont court denied
A's claim to be reimbursed from B's estate. It is seen that this is
very much the same case as In re Bryant's Estate,05 where A recovered.
The court gives six reasons for its holding, none of which seem at all
compelling. It certainly makes no difference that C (the administrator, not yet in office) had not contractedwith A, or that C had no
duty as to the horses at the time A acted. It cannot be true that A
had no humanitarian duty toward the horses, for he had the care of
them when B died and was therefore the appropriate person to go on
feeding them. The court says it did not appear that A expected
compensation, or that his action was necessary, since it did not appear
that others were not at hand to give the care. A might be reasonably
presumed to have expected compensation, but a jury should have
found as to this. It would seem that the facts might be taken to
make out a prima facie case for A on the question of the necessity
for his service. If he had pushed aside those who were better entitled to act than he, that ought to be shown. The merely negative
argument used seems hardly sufficient. The conclusion the court
based on the foregoing reasons is that there was no unjust enrichment,
notwithstanding the estate may have been benefited; for the plaintiff
was a volunteer, and that defeats him, however it might be if he were
not. The best commentary on this case is that of Todd v. Martin,"
which passes lightly over the difficulties mentioned by the Vermont
court, and reaches an opposite conclusion.
(c) Public school cases: The following cases are somewhat out of
line here, since in these cases A loans money (instead of bestowing
"78 Vt. 414, 63 Atl. 143 (19o6). For public interest in animals see supra
Part I (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, 25, 49, n. 58.
65Supra note 53.
664 Calif. Unrep. Cas. 8o5, 37 Pac. 872 (1894).
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time and labor) for the completion (as well as repair) of school
buildings, and for furnishing the equipment necessary to their
greatest public utility. However, this is in a true sense the saving of
property. The cases could well have been included among those
dealing with mistake as to the powers of agents.17 In Baggerly v.
BainbridgeState Bank6 8 A loaned money to C (school district trustees)
to pay the current operating expenses of the schools. C had no
power to borrow for this purpose, and so there had been technically
no request from B (the school corporation) for the loan. While
A was not allowed to recover on C's notes, he was allowed to recover
for all his money which had been received and actually used to defray
school expenses, being subrogated to this extent to the rights of the
creditors. But relief was denied in Strickler v. Consolidated School
69
District,
on similar facts. A, the school directors, being forbidden
by the state constitution to borrow beyond a certain amount, advanced of their own resources the additional money which was needed
to complete a school house. A was denied recovery from B (the
consolidated school district) on the ground that permitting this would
be evading or nullifying the constitutional mandate. "Appellants
[A] were volunteers pure and simple, and it is well settled that a
court of equity will not aid a pure volunteer... Evidently they
had the interest and welfare of their community very much at heart.
Itis to be regretted therefore that they should become the victims of
their own misguided zeal for the public good."""ea
3. A preserves B's property in the face of B's neglect thereof or his
positive refusal of such service:70 The neglect of an owner to protect
his property may have two aspects. He may know that it is imperiled, and yet not care to save it; or he may have intended to act,
and later forgotten or "neglected" to take action. The first shows
unwillingness to save; the second does not. In the former case, A's
intervention would be unnecessary and without benefit and therefore
officious, meddlesome. In the latter case, it might well not be such.
Where B intentionally neglects his property, as well as where he
6t

223.
68I6o Ga. 556, 128 S. R. 766 (1925).
S. W. 136, 5o A. L. R. 1287 (Mo. 1927) (note collecting cases). The

Supra p.

69291

n6te says this case stands practically alone in such holding, the other cases in
point being practically unanimous in allowing reimbursement to one who has
loaned or advanced money for strictly public school purposes. The few cases
agreeing with the Strickler case are readily distinguishable from the Baggerly
case, supra note 68, in that either the loan was not necessary, or the money was
not used for school purposes and therefore was of no benefit to the taxpayers.
69a.TId. 138.
7
0WooDwAAD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 197, and n. 3.
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openly refuses A's services regarding it, A's intervention would be a
"forcing of his services", and unless public interest or sentiment demanded his action, it would be inexcusably officious. 71 The old case
of Stokes v. Lewis7 ' illustrates the situation where public interest is
lacking. A, one of two united parishes, paid the whole of the salary
of a joint sexton, one-half of which had been customarily paid by B,
the other parish. Before A paid, B had given A notice that it did
not wish to pay its half. Lord Mansfield, C. J., denying A recovery
for money paid, said that A had paid the quota of the other "in spite
of their teeth".73
Public interest cases: A preserves B's animal against B's express refusal to care for it or pay A for so doing: In Great Northern Ry. v.
71

The Roman law did not allow the gestor to act if the principal had forbidden
him. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW (1927) 303: "By the weight of ancient
authority, the contrary action of negotiorum gestio never lay, if the principal
did not wish the act to be done, or expressly forbade it, or if he objected to the
volunteer for personal reasons. Justinian finally determined that, to free himself from liability, notice of the principal's refusal must actually reach the agent,
and that for services rendered before such notice the principal was liable." The
Roman law did not distinguish a special class of cases involving public interest
in a high degree, as the English law does. The public interest underlay the whole
doctrine evenly, but apparently was not allowed to override the principal's veto
in the saving of his property. The confusion and uncertainty of the English law
is thus notably absent from the Roman system. Probably it is true to put it
thus: The Roman law saw the public good in the good of the individual; while
the English law saw the individual's good in the public good.
721 T. R. 20 (1785).
"See Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 5o (1882). But in Gillette v. Ins. Co.
of N. America, 39 Ill. App. 284 (189o), A, an insurance agent, probably for selfinterested reasons, paid a premium on B's policy, B having -neglectedto pay it.
The company brought an action against B for A's benefit. Held, that A was
subrogated to the company's rights, and that no assignment was necessary for
A to recover the premium from B. In Stern v. Haas, 54 N. D. 346, 2o9 N. W.
784 (1926), A and B occupied halves of a house separated by a common stairway
and hall. Each tenant occupied her half of the stairs and hall and had an easement in the other half. An ordinance required that halls and stairs should be
kept clean and lighted, but the manner and degree of doing this was left uncertain.
A, a tidy person, thought B too slovenly in the care of her half and spent time
and labor, and also money, in cleaning and lighting the whole hall and stairs.
The court denied A reimbursement from B for her extra effort in the common
cause on the general ground, as the writer understands, that A could not thus
force her superior notions of housekeeping on her negligent neighbor and make
the latter pay for them. The question of whether B benefited from A's work
might be an open one. Also, was not the benefit of the light an incidental benefit?
The better conditions were obviously not necessary to B. See opposed views on
the case in (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV. 799, and (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 220. Public
interest is suggested as a factor. The court does not term A officious.
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Swaffield, 74 A was allowed recovery, but Earle v. Coburn75 denied it
and was followed in this by Keith v. De Bussigney. 76
IV. A saves B's life, health, or limb: Under the prevailing ideas of
western civilization it could probably seldom or never be accounted
officious for any one to intervene to save another's life77 whenever an
emergency threatens. "Danger invites rescue." Not only is public
interest strongly engaged, but in normal cases there is the greatest
conceivable benefit to him whose life is saved. The irrebuttable
presumption of gratuitous service, which figures so largely in the
saving of property, is apparently used without exception here,
save in the case of professional persons such as physicians, surgeons,
and nurses.7 8 Since it is their business to save life, health, and limb,
the presumption is that they intend to charge, and that those treated
4
7 L. R. 9 Ex. 132 (1874).
B had a horse sent to himself over the plaintiff railroad (A). It arrived at night, and B was not there to accept it. A, having no
place to keep it, placed it this first night in C's livery stable on B's credit. Dispute ensued, B refusing to accept the horse or to pay C. A paid C for keeping
it there for some time, meaning to get its money back from B. Finally B accepted
the horse, and A sued for reimbursement. The court said B failed his duty in
not calling for the horse on its arrival, and that A had a duty of common humanity
to take reasonable care of the horse. A was allowed to recover not only the charges
for the first night but also those for the ensuing months, although A paid C the
latter charges against B's express refusal to be answerable for them. KEENER,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 399, says: "The court put the case on the short ground
that, as the plaintiff had acted reasonably and in discharge of a duty," the
defendant ought to reimburse him.'
75130 Mass. 596 (188I).

761 7 9 Mass. 255, 60 N. E. 614 (igoi). The same arguments made in the case

of Force v. Haines, supra pp. 231, 232, apply equally well against the decisions
in these two cases. See Morse v. Kenney, 87 Vt. 445, 89 Atl. 865 (I914). See
PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920) § 1518: "The result of such decisions is, in many
cases, to give to A the choice between letting the animal starve to death or feeding
it at his own expense.... Should the case of animals be controlled by the principles which apply to the preservation of inanimate property, or should the fact
that animals suffer from want of food, as well as deteriorate in value, be sufficient to justify a departure from the ordinary rules of law? If provision were
made generally for feeding deserted animals by some public officer at the expense
of their owner, it might be proper to hold that the duty of A, on finding that B
has left his animal without food, is to report that fact to the proper officer, and
not to feed them at B's expense. If no such provision is made, the only humane
rule is to permit A to feed them, and to allow him to recover the expense thereof from B." See also Costigan's criticism of the Coburn case, supra note 75, in
op. cit. supranote 12, at 43, 45. For a case somewhat like that of Morse v. Kenney,
supra, but distinguishable therefrom, see First Nat. Bank v. Matlock, 99 Okla.
150, 226 Pac. 328 (1924), 36 A. L. R. lO88 (1925).

"WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 197.
7"bid. § 201.
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by them expect to pay.8a' All other persons, however, are presumed
by the common law to give their services in life emergency cases without expectation of pay, nor at the common law, seemingly, was there
ever any obligation on others apart from contract to pay them for
such emergency services. For two reasons, therefore, a non-professional, acting in emergency, can never be called officious as to the
one imperiled, for (i) action is invited by the endangered person
and the public, and (2) the intervenor, supposedly, never intends to
charge such person. This would not hold true, however, if he intended to charge some third person whose duty he was performing
in saving the life, as in the case of paupers.
In non-emergency cases, professional persons and laymen would
be judged by the same rules as to their officiousness. Nor is there any
longer a presumption that the layman means to make a gift of his
services.
An interesting question still remains: Can a physician acting in an
emergency ever be considered officious? A number of tort cases
serve to throw some light on this question. Since the use of anaesthetics became general in surgery, there have been cases where a
contract has been made with a patient to perform a definite and
limited operation upon him, and later, when he has become unconscious, and exploratory incisions have revealed another and
unsuspected danger requiring immediate action, the surgeon in the
exercise of his best judgment has extended the operation agreed
upon or cut out some other more diseased organ. To this the patient's
previous consent was never given, and since he was unconscious
at the time the operation had to be performed, the act was done
without getting his later consent to it. The question is: Should
not the old common law rule requiring the patient's consent to everything done be changed now to conform to these new conditions?
Is it not to the interest of the public and the patient that the skilled
and responsible surgeon should be given a free hand to do what is
necessary to save life and health with the least danger and suffering
and expense, without the express consent of the patient being had
beforehand?79 Some courts have already answered this in the affirm7
8In
re Agnew's Estate, 132 Misc. 466, 230 N. Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1928)
(gratuitous service by mistake; recovery allowed); see (1929) 14 CORNELL LAW

QUARTERLY 239.

79For an interesting article dealing at length with this question and discussing
some of the cases in point, see Straub, The Surgeon and the Unconscious Patient
(1929)
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The courts are divided on the question of the phy-

sician's liability. For a case where the physician finds the patient unconscious
on his arrival, see Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 6ox, 104 S. W. 164 (1907), where
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ative. These are tort cases, it is true, the surgeon (A) being defendant
in all of them and never a plaintiff asking remuneration for the
voluntary performance of an act necessary and beneficial to the
patient (B). But the fact that some courts have held A to have been
justified in doing the unrequested act doubtless means that A could
have reimbursement from B for work and labor performed. If A
was thought to have been officious, he could not recover, as B, in
that case, would not be unjustly enriched, though he had benefited
by the operation. Evidently, the idea that A was officious never
occurred to court or counsel.
If such should prove to be the law in these cases, it would be in
strict conformity to the principles of the Roman doctrine of negotiorum gestio, or rather to that doctrine extended, for apparently
that rule was never applied to cases of saving life, but only to property
cases. Nevertheless it is a true "uncommissioned agency". The
service was necessary and useful and reasonably undertaken, since B
could not do it for himself, and there was no time or opportunity
to consult with him. True, A is a volunteer, as B did not know the
act was being done, or request it. All that, however, is immaterial,
since it was done to benefit B, and he was actually benefited. A was
under no legal obligation to do the act, nor was B under any legal
obligation to allow the act to be done. No case could better show the
fallacy of bringing contract and the requisites of contract into these
quasi contractual situations.
Would it be officious for a physician to attempt to prolong the life
of a person in extremis against the protest of such person? Suppose
(a) B is unconscious when A (physician) anives, but before that B,
who is in the last stages of cancer, had been often heard by A to
express the wish to die. (b) B is conscious when A arrives, but
protests against A's doing anything to prolong his life and agony.
(c) B is a Christian Scientist and does not desire A's services, or his
presence, or that of any regular practitioner. (d) B's wife is in
extremis. She requests A's services, but B dissents in A's presence,
either because B is a Christian Scientist, or because B does not believe
that A is a competent physician. Would A, meaning at the time to
charge B, be officious in treating B's wife at her request, but against
B's protest? Here, B owes a legal duty of care to his wife, while
recovery was allowed. No element of contract, of course, could be found here.
See BisHoP, op. cit. supranote 15, § 2.31; (I9o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 58. See Btandner
v. Krebbs, 54 Ill. App. 652 (1894), where recovery was denied, but only because
A had given credit to a third person, and not because the court thought him
officious. For other cases, see WOODWARD, op. cit. supranote 7, § 201.
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in the case of his own life, he owes no legal duty to any one to prolong
it. In the first three cases, would the law "raise" an implied promise
in B to repay A, against B's own protest? According to the language
of the court in Earle v. Coburn0 it would seem not.
V. Where officiousness does not attach to A's act because of its public
interest: (a) Where A buriesB's wife: This subject has been sufficiently
discussed 8' when we considered the matter of "proper person".
It may be added that the Roman law protected A in such cases by
allowing him to recover in an action called the actio funeraria8 ,
which differed from the ordinary negotiorum gestio mainly in that it
lay even "when he on whom the duty of burial lay forbade it to him
who made the burial."
(b) Where A furnishes necessaries to B's wife or child: Here the
question of officiousness may be said hardly to exist. Scarcely a
reference is made to "proper person", any person being allowed to
act. As the husband in such cases is in the wrong, having abandoned
or failed to provide for his family, no notice to him is requisite before
supplying the necessaries. The law does not require vain acts. So,
also, A may act even against B's express prohibition and refusal to
pay, though given in advance."
"Supra note 75. See also the Falcke case, supra note 58, where it is said that
benefits cannot be conferred upon a man against his will.
Supra Part I (1929) 15 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 25, 42 et seg.
8MACKELDEY,

op. cit. supra note 55, at 373: see Heilman, op. cit. supra note 46,

at 79.

3In Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692, 21 L. R. A. 673 (1893),
it was held that money loaned to B's wife to buy necessaries and actually so
used was not itself a necessary. The point was also made that, as B's wife paid
cash for the goods, there was never any debt against B which was paid with A's
money, and therefore nothing for A to be subrogated to. The decision seems
rather technical. If A had had B's wife buy upon B's credit, and then paid the
bill, or if A had given her the necessaries out of his own stock, or had allowed the

dealer (C) to charge him (A) for them, or if A had bought the goods outright
and then handed them to B's wife, doubtless he could have recovered from B.
See Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray 172 (Mass. 1857); Wells v. Lachenmeyer, 2
How. Pr. (N. S.) 252 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). The distinction between necessaries
and money to buy them with was rejected in Kenyon, v. Farris, 47 Conn. 5io
(I88O), and this has found general acceptance in the United States. In this case
recovery was allowed against B in equity but not in law. In De Brauwere v.
De Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 46o, 96 N. E. 722 (I9II), B's deserted wife supported
herself and children by labor and the expenditure of her own money. She was
allowed recovery against her husband in a direct action. In neither case is
officiousness spoken of. In Turner v. Woolworth, 165 App. Div. 70, I5I N. Y.
Supp. 93 (2d Dept. 1914), A, the attorney for B's wife in a suit for divorce and
alimony, furnished the wife money for necessaries pending the trial and was
subrogated to her rights in the alimony.
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The same principles
(c) Where A furnishes necessariesto a pauper:8
are here involved. The county or municipality usually has the legal
duty of providing such necessaries. This legal duty is usually imposed by statute, though these vary considerably in their import or
the interpretation put upon them. Usually it has been held that,
if the public authorities have failed after due notice and demand to
perform this duty, anyone may supply the pauper with necessaries
and recover from the officials charged with the duty. Probably even
such notice would be excused in a case of great emergency, especially
where it is medical services that are required, though it is hard to
see why food and shelter might not be as instantly imperative in
certain cases. In the same way, if one public corporation provides
for a pauper or poor person whose support is legally a charge upon
another public corporation or certain individuals, the former may
recover from the latter.
VI. A underthe compulsion of self-interest or self-protection performs
B's legal obligation:In this relationship, where B is primarily liable to
satisfy a debt or other legal obligation, and A is only secondarily
liable upon it and fulfills it only to protect his own interests which are
threatened by B's default, the courts are nearly unanimous in considering A to be neither a volunteer nor officious. In such cases,
neither request nor ratification by B is required. Self-protection
needs no contract, A's act being regarded in the same light as where
he is compelled to act by a contractual obligation, of which the relation of suretyship is a standard example.
The assent of the courts to this proposition being so general, it
would be useless to cite cases in support of it. But it is of interest
to inquire what kind or degree of interest A must have to bring him
within the protection of this principle. A brief summary of some cases
will indicate the mind of the courts on this point: (i) A owns an
article which is in B's possession; and A pays B's debt to C to save his
property from seizure or detention by C in the latter's collection of
his claim against B;'1 (2) A, a mortgagee, pays B's mortgage debt,
or taxes, or, as a junior lienor, pays B's debt to C, a senior lienor; ss
(3) A, a tenant for years, pays off an encumbrance on land, of which
B is the tenant in remainder.8 7 The above three cases are those of
most frequent occurrence. A recovers regularly, and officiousness

UWooDWARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 204, cites many cases on this point.
85Wells v. Porter, 7 Wend. 119 (N. Y. 1831); ExaU v. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308

(1799).
uHogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255 (i881).
87
Downing v. Hartshorn, 69 Neb. 364, 95 N. W. 8oi (i9O3).
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would hardly ever be charged. Other similar situations are given
by Woodward.8 8 (4) A lien is sufficient,"9 and so is a dower right.9 0
In general, it may be said that any vested interest which the law
recognizes will justify A's intervening in self-protection. But the
cases go even further, some of them allowing A to come in although
his "property" interest has become very thin, being one in expectancy
merely, or even existing in A's belief or fancy and not in actuality, as
the event turns out to be. Such a case is: (5) A, after assignment of a
lease to B, pays taxes for which B is primarily liable, A being bound
to pay them only by reason of his covenant with a third person.
A's interest in the land ceased entirely with his assignment of the
lease to B. 9' (6) A, having merely a future and contingent interest
in the real estate under a will, pays off a mortgage on it with her own
money, in order to save such interest from a present loss. The real
estate never vested absolutely in A, but in her brother. A was
subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee who had been paid with her
money. A was held not to have been a volunteer any more than
if the real estate had been absolutely hers at the time she paid.2
(7) A, a widow, by mistake of foreign law thought she had an interest
in her deceased husband's land in the foreign state, whereas she had
none at all. Held, that her discharge of the husband's purchase
money notes with her own money entitled her to be subrogated
to the rights of the payee. Of course, this coalesces with the mistake
cases, and the court, as the whist phrase goes, "takes A out" on that
score.93
The above cases show a range of interest in physical property that
reaches all the way from ownership to no actual interest at all but
merely a supposed one. Compare, now, such cases with one like
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Thomas,9 4 where an insurance
88

0p. cit. supra note 7, § 248, and p. 393, n. 2.
1rvine v. Angus, 93 Fed. 629 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899). This case is interesting
on the point of officiousness.
9
"Bayles v. Husted, 4o Hun 376 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1886).
9
Mason v. Smith, 131 Mass. 510 (1881). See also Wills v. Summers, 45 Minn.
90, 47 N. W. 463 (189o), which is a similar case, but here a statute made taxes
due a lien against A.
"See supranote 24 for cases where property was in litigation between A and B
at the time A paid taxes on it.
nWalker v. Walker, supra note 24.
9459 Kan. 470, 53 Pac. 472 (1898). In accord is Gillette v. Ins. Co. of N.
America, supra note 73. See the note collecting the cases on this point in (1928)
56 A. L. R. 674. Most of the cases deny A a right to recover on these facts, either
because they construe the mortgage clause of the policy as a mere conditionnot a covenant-or because, even viewing it as a covenant, there is no privity
89
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agent, compelled only by a self-serving rule of his company and his
own natural desire to get his commissions and build up his business,
pays a premium on which B, the policy holder, had defaulted or was
about to default. In this case, the agent was allowed to be subrogated
to the rights of his company against B, who, by the court's interpretation of the contract, had covenanted to pay the premiums
to the company (C). Of course, there was no privity of contract between B and A, but the court thought this was unnecessary, for
equity did not require it, and since B had the benefit of A's money
in the protection of the policy which A had prevented from lapsing,
equity will subrogate A to C's rights. It was said that A was not a
mere volunteer in so paying and may proceed against B and recover in his own name and right.
What can be said for this decision? Was A "required" or "compelled" to pay because his material interests urged him strongly to
do so? If we suppose B to have "neglected" the payment of the
premium in the sense of having forgotten to pay it, A's payment
would be of benefit to B in keeping his property protected, and if the
property had happened to be destroyed by fire just after A's paying,
the benefit would have been very great. The policy itself may be
regarded as a valuable piece of property. A and B are both interested in this piece of property-from different standpoints, it is
true. The lapsing of policies is a bad thing for the insurance agent
and his company. A's interest in B's policy is represented by the
labor, time, and skill invested in the effort to get B to take it in
the first place. A will also get renewal premiums if the policy is
kept in force and will lose them if it is allowed to lapse. Public
policy, too, is perhaps an element to be considered. It is for the
public good that losses should be evenly distributed and borne by
the united strength of many, rather than that a loss should overwhelm an individual. Is A's "interest" in this contract so much less
than where a widow has no interest at all in her dead husband's
property and pays her money because she merely thinks she has an
interest?
Another case similar in principle is Noble v. Williams,5 where A, a
school teacher, in order to perform his contract to the advantage of
himself and the community, was obliged to advance out of his own
pocket the money necessary to pay for school rent and equipment,
between A and B. In Whitehead v. Wilson Knitting Mills, z94 N. C. 281, 139
S. E. 456 (1927), B had positively refused to pay the premium, but in spite of
this A paid it for him. The denial of recovery here certainly is correct.
"515o Ky. 439, 150 S. W. 507 (1912), 42 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1,77 (1913).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
which money it was the statutory duty of the school board to provide
and thus apply, but which they had failed to do after due notice.
The court here refused relief: "No man entirely of his own volition
can make another his debtor." It said that A should have brought
mandamus against the school board or sued them on his contract.
But in certain other cases, identical in principle, this argument
has not prevailed, notably in Eastgate v. Osago School District,"
where B, the district board of education, was under a statutory
duty to transport children from their homes to school. B, after
request, refused to perform this duty, and A, who was the father
of certain of these children entitled to transportation at the public
expense, carried them to school himself in his own wagon. Here,
recovery at law was allowed, and it was held that A was not required
first to resort to the action of mandamus.
From this study of officiousness it will be seen that A's intervention in B's affairs will meet with constant favor at the hands of
English and American courts only when there is some special public
interest at stake, or when because of B's default A must act to protect
himself. With respect, it is suggested that the principles governing
approved action in an intervenor should be so extended in the direction called for by equity and the true principles of quasi contractual
law, as to insure reimbursement for useful and necessary services
reasonably rendered another, though without his request, or ratification, or subsequent promise to pay.
9641 N. D. 518, 171 N. W. 96 (1919). See the same holding in Sommers v.
Putnam County Board, 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N. E. 682 (1925), and a note commenting thereon in (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 83z, where the writer quite properly
observes, it would seem, that, where there is a strong moral obligation in A,
united with a pronounced public interest, the decision should be for A. See also
(1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 114; (1926) 24 MICH. L. Rv. 511.

